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Global emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) from fossil fuels and industry increased by 2.2% 24	
per year on average between 2005 and 20151. Global emissions need to peak and decline 25	
rapidly to limit climate change to well below two degrees Celsius of warming2,3, one of the 26	
goals of the Paris Agreement4. Untangling the reasons underlying recent changes in 27	
emissions trajectories is critical to guide efforts to attain those goals. Here we analyse the 28	
drivers of decreasing CO2 emissions in a group of 18 industrial countries that have 29	
decarbonized over the period 2005-2015. We show that within this group, the 30	
displacement of fossil fuels by renewable energy and decreases in energy use explain 31	
decreasing CO2 emissions. However the decrease in energy use can be explained at least in  32	
part by a lower growth in GDP. Correlation analysis suggests that policies on renewable 33	
energy are supporting emissions reductions and displacing fossil fuels in these 18 34	
countries, but not elsewhere, and that policies on energy efficiency are supporting lower 35	
energy use in these 18 countries as well as more widely. Overall, the evidence shows that 36	
efforts to reduce emissions are underway in many countries, but they need to be 37	
maintained and enhanced by more stringent policy actions to support a global peak in 38	
emissions followed by global emissions reductions in line with the goals of the Paris 39	
Agreement3. 40	
 41	
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Fossil fuel CO2 emissions are the main cause of human-induced climate change5. Historically, 1	
they have increased over timescales of many decades in all countries6. However, since the 2	
mid-1970s, emissions have peaked and subsequently declined consistently in several 3	
European countries, initially because of energy resource substitutions from coal to oil, gas 4	
and nuclear power. Since the early 1990s, transfers of emissions through international trade 5	
have also contributed to emission reductions in some countries7,8, although this effect 6	
stabilized around 2005 in most developed economies1. In the period since 2000, global fossil 7	
fuel emissions have increased rapidly driven by the rapid industrialization of China1,9. Yet, 8	
emissions in the USA and in Europe have decreased for over a decade, reducing the rate of 9	
increase globally9.  10	
Understanding the drivers of emissions trends in countries where emissions are consistently 11	
decreasing could indicate whether efforts to decarbonise energy systems and tackle climate 12	
change are truly in motion, or whether they are simply reflecting secular trends in national 13	
and global economies. In addition, despite significant attention given to policies and 14	
measures to tackle climate change4,10, it is not clear if they have significantly influenced 15	
national emission trends consistently across all countries10-13. The scale of government and 16	
non-government led actions to reduce emissions has grown in recent years, but a broad 17	
assessment of their overall effect is largely missing.	18	
In this analysis, we use national CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion from the 19	
International Energy Agency (see Methods). We isolate a ‘peak-and-decline’ group of 18 20	
countries where emissions have significantly decreased over the period 2005-2015 21	
considering both territorial and consumption emissions (Fig. 1; Supplementary Figure S1). 22	
The peak-and-decline group represents 28% of global emissions. We also select two control 23	
groups for reference. Both control groups include countries where emissions have not 24	
significantly decreased, but distinguish low GDP growth (group A, 30 countries) and high 25	
GDP growth (group B, 31 countries; see Methods). 	26	
Emissions in the peak-and-decline group decreased by –2.4% [–2.9% to –1.4%] per year on 27	
average during 2005-2015 (Table S1-S2; numbers indicate the median and 25-75 percentile; 28	
see Methods). To understand why, we decompose country-level emissions trends among 29	
four contributing factors representing physical drivers (Table 1; see Methods): (1) energy use 30	
– changes in final energy, attributable to changes in the efficiency with which energy 31	
services are provided and consumed; (2) fossil share – changes in the share of fossil fuels in 32	
final energy (including electricity and heat generated from fossil fuels), reflecting the 33	
displacement of fossil fuels by non-fossil energy including renewables and nuclear; (3) fossil 34	
utilisation rate – changes in the ratio of fossil final energy over fossil primary energy, 35	
representing energy consumed or lost in energy extraction, conversion and transmission; 36	
and (4), fossil CO2 intensity – changes in the carbon intensity of fossil energy, reflecting the 37	
proportion and fuel quality of coal, oil and gas in the overall fossil fuel mix. 	38	
Results show that the largest contribution to emissions decreases in the peak-and-decline 39	
group for 2005-2015 was from decreases in the fossil share of final energy, accounting for a 40	
median of 47% [36 to 73%] of the decrease in emissions (Fig. 2), and decreases in energy 41	
use, accounting for 36% [18% to 56%]. There was no substantial contribution at the group 42	
level from changes in fossil utilisation rate or from changes in fossil CO2 intensity (Fig. 2). 43	
Outsourcing of emissions through trade was small relative to these four physical drivers and 44	
does not account for their substantial contribution to CO2 reductions (Fig. 2). Results were 45	
similar across available datasets (Table S3). 46	
Some country-level variation within the peak-and-decline group is notable (Table S3-S4). 47	
First, contributions to emissions decreases in the USA were more evenly distributed across 48	
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the four drivers, with the largest single contributor coming from the switch from coal to gas 1	
driven by the availability of shale gas. Second, the contribution of decreases in the fossil 2	
share of energy alone dominated emissions decreases in Austria, Finland, and Sweden, 3	
consistent with a rising market share of renewables in power generation and/or heat. 4	
Finally, the contribution of reductions in energy use dominated emissions decreases in 5	
France, Ireland, Netherland, Spain, the United Kingdom, as well as the EU28, despite the 6	
economies growing.  7	
These drivers of emissions in the peak-and-decline group were distinct from those of the 8	
control groups, where changes in emissions are dominated by changes in energy use alone. 9	
In group A (low GDP growth), increases in energy use accounted for 75% [–11 to 130%] of 10	
the increase in CO2 emissions, with no substantial contributions from the three other factors 11	
(Table S5; Fig. S2). In group B (high GDP growth), increases in energy use accounted for 79% 12	
[58 to 90%] of the increase in CO2 emissions, with an additional contribution of 16% [2 to 13	
29%] from the rising share of fossil energy in final energy. Many rapidly growing economies 14	
are seeing coal and oil's share rising faster than renewable or other low-carbon energy. 15	
Changes in CO2 emissions in the peak-and-decline group differ from previous changes 16	
observed since 1960 (Fig. 3). During the 1960s and 1970s, CO2 emissions grew rapidly, driven 17	
by a large increase in energy use. This was partly offset by reductions in fossil CO2 intensity 18	
due to a switch from coal to oil and gas following market forces (e.g., economically 19	
exploitable natural gas resources) and environmental regulations (e.g., air pollution 20	
controls). From the early 1980s to the early 2000s, CO2 emissions grew more slowly. The 21	
effect of continuing increases in energy use was partly offset by reductions in the fossil share 22	
of energy due to the expansion of nuclear power with a smaller contribution from changes in 23	
fossil CO2 intensity in the 1990s. Changes in CO2 emissions in the decade 2005-2015 are a 24	
break from historical trends in that they are supported by the largest decreases in the fossil 25	
fuel share observed since 1960, and by the only decrease in energy use sustained over a 26	
decade. 27	
We further examine the decrease in energy use during 2005-2015 by decomposing the 28	
drivers of energy use into the associated growth in GDP, and the energy intensity of that 29	
GDP which also captures structural change in the economy (see Methods). The decrease in 30	
energy use in the 2005-2015 period is associated with low growth in GDP of around 1% per 31	
year in the peak-and-decline group, and reductions in the energy intensity of GDP of around 32	
–1% to –2% per year (Fig. S3). These reductions in energy intensity of GDP in 2005-2015 do 33	
not stand out compared to similar reductions observed since the 1970s (Fig. S3), indicating 34	
that decreases in energy use in the peak-and-decline group could be explained at least in 35	
part by the lower growth in GDP. 36	
To gain insights into the likely persistence of the 2005-2015 trends, we compare the drivers 37	
of decreasing CO2 emissions in 2005-2015 in the peak-and-decline group to the drivers of 38	
decarbonization in six global Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs)14 used to explore future 39	
energy transformation pathways consistent with limiting climate change to two degrees of 40	
warming (Fig. S4). The IAMs project emission decreases over the period 2010 to 2020 in the 41	
EU and USA driven primarily by decreases in the fossil share of energy and by changes in the 42	
fossil CO2 intensity (including carbon capture and storage in some models), with a smaller 43	
contribution from improvements in fossil utilisation rate. Changes in energy use do not 44	
contribute systematically to emissions reductions in these near-term IAM projections (Fig. 45	
S4; Table S6). However, the IAMs also assume annual GDP growth of 2.4% which is over 46	
double that observed in the past decade in the peak-and-decline group. For a fixed GDP 47	
growth15, one widely-used IAM sees reductions in energy use make a growing contribution 48	
to emission decreases as climate targets become more stringent (Fig. S4). Although the IAM 49	
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simulations are not designed for short-term analysis16, this comparison suggests that if GDP 1	
returns to strong growth in the peak-and-decline group, reductions in energy use may 2	
weaken or be reversed unless strong climate and energy policies are implemented.  3	
Finally, we examine the role of climate and energy policies as drivers of emissions reductions 4	
during 2005-2015. We separate policies broadly into three types according to whether they 5	
promote (1) renewable energy, (2) energy efficiency, or (3) climate change mitigation and 6	
adaptation (referred to below as ‘climate policy frameworks’; see Methods). We use the 7	
numbers of policies adopted in law per country between 2005 and 2015, as a general 8	
indicator of the political commitment of a government to promote or restrict activities 9	
affecting carbon emissions17. Although a simple measure, numbers of policies are a useful 10	
first-order proxy of policy influence with precedent in the literature18, as supported by a 11	
detailed study of the US states19 and a comparative study among industrial countries20. 	12	
In the peak-and-decline group, there were 35 [27-51] and 23 [15-35] policies per country in 13	
place by 2015 that promoted energy efficiency and renewable energy respectively (Table 2). 14	
This is substantially more than in either of the control groups (Table 2). Numbers of climate-15	
change mitigation policies were also higher but more similar amongst the groups, with 10 [8-16	
12] framework policies per country in the peak-and-decline group, compared to 7 [5-8] and 17	
8 [5-10] respectively in control groups A and B.	18	
In the peak-and-decline group, correlations between the drivers of emission decreases and 19	
the numbers of relevant policies were all of the expected sign.  Decreases in energy use 20	
were correlated with the number of energy-efficiency policies (r=–0.54). Decreases in the 21	
fossil share of energy were correlated with policies on renewable energy (r=–0.75). 22	
Decreases in total emissions were correlated with the number of climate policy frameworks 23	
(r=–0.54; Table 2). Negative correlations indicate that larger reductions in emissions take 24	
place when more policies are in place. Decreases in energy intensity of GDP (see Methods) 25	
were also correlated with policies on energy efficiency (r=–0.42) but with significance only at 26	
the 90% level (Table 2). 27	
In both control groups, the numbers of policies on energy efficiency were not significantly 28	
correlated with trends in energy use. However they were significantly correlated with trends 29	
in energy intensity of GDP. This suggests that policies have an effect on energy efficiency, 30	
but that effect is hidden by the effect of GDP growth on energy demand. For control group B 31	
(high GDP), trends in the fossil share of energy correlated positively with the number of 32	
policies on renewable energy (r=0.51). Renewables growth in these rapidly-expanding 33	
economies is adding additional capacity rather than displacing fossil fuels. Finally, in both 34	
control groups, there was a positive correlation between the trends in emissions and the 35	
number of climate-policy frameworks, which could reflect actions on climate change 36	
adaptation rather than mitigation. The number of climate policy frameworks was too small 37	
to test the effects of adaptation and mitigation policies separately. 38	
These correlations provide indirect evidence that policies on energy efficiency may be 39	
playing an important role in driving emission reductions across countries, and that policies 40	
on renewable energy act to displace fossil fuel energy in the peak-and-decline group, but not 41	
elsewhere. Climate policy frameworks also appear to support emissions reductions but only 42	
in the peak-and-decline group, perhaps due to the larger number of policy frameworks in 43	
place. Although it is possible that the correlations could be due to other factors, the more 44	
mature implementation of a larger number of policies in the peak-and-decline group 45	
compared to the two control groups have a clear interpretation that energy and climate 46	
policies support emissions reductions. 	47	
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Looking forward, the persistence of the decreases in emissions over the coming decades will 1	
depend primarily on structural decreases in energy use and in the share of fossils in the 2	
energy mix. To maintain and enhance decreases in energy use in the peak-and-decline 3	
group, policy support needs to be enhanced, particularly if GDP growth increases. Further 4	
support for reductions in energy use could tackle consumption21,22 or the efficiency of 5	
energy-service provision as well as energy-conversion efficiencies in end-use technologies23 6	
(Table 2). More detailed representation of the policy and non-policy drivers of energy use in 7	
models should also help further explore the solution-space for deep mitigation24. The large-8	
scale deployment of renewable energy is not sufficient by and of itself to lead to durable 9	
emissions decreases; it needs to be delivered within a framework of strong and supportive 10	
climate policies.  11	
Finally, as significant as they have been, the emissions reductions observed and analysed in 12	
the 18 countries of the peak-and-decline group fall a long way short of the deep and rapid 13	
global decarbonisation of the energy system implied by the Paris Agreement temperature 14	
goals3, especially given the increases in global CO2 emissions in 2017 and 2018, and the 15	
slowdown of decarbonisation in Europe since 201425. To limit climate change well below two 16	
degrees Celsius, global emissions in 2030 need to be about 25% below 2018 levels26. Recent 17	
acceleration in the deployment of renewable energy worldwide will only translate in to 18	
emissions reductions if accompanied by extensive measures to phase out the use of fossil 19	
fuels27.  20	21	
	 6	
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Table 1. Description of the drivers of emissions changes as represented in Equation (2). The 2	
examples describe factors that could lead to decreases in emissions.  3	
Description	 Short name	 Examples of factors contributing to  
declining emissions	
FE: Final energy, 
representing energy at the 
point of use	 Energy use	 • lower quantities of energy services consumed (e.g., less heating or mobility)	
• improved efficiency of energy services 
(e.g., insulated homes or higher 
occupancy vehicles)	
• improved energy-conversion efficiency 
of end-use technologies (e.g., more 
efficient boilers or cars)	
• electrification of heat engines (e.g., 
replacing internal combustion engines 
or gas- or diesel-powered mechanical 
equipment by electric motors)	
Cf: Fossil final energy/Final 
energy, representing the 
share of fossil fuels in final 
energy	
Fossil share	 • decrease in direct use of fossil energy 
(e.g., gas for heating or coal for 
industrial processes)	
• increase in share of non-fossil low-
carbon energy for electricity/heat 
generation or final use, including 
nuclear and renewables (e.g., wind, 
solar, hydro, biomass)	
Cr: Fossil primary 
energy/Fossil final energy, 
representing aggregated 
energy use and losses 
from extracting fossil 
energy and converting it 
to fuels, electricity or heat 
for final consumption	
Fossil 
utilisation rate	 • improved thermal conversion efficiency (e.g., fossil power generation or 
refining)	
• lower transmission & distribution losses	
• lower fossil industry own use, including 
in extraction such as mining and in 
energy used by power plants and 
refineries (other than energy losses in 
conversion or refining processes 
themselves)	
• less use of refined/transformed fossil 
products (e.g., switch from electric to 
gas heating if the electricity is fossil-
generated)	
	 7	
Ci: CO2/Fossil primary 
energy, representing the 
carbon content of the 
fossil fuel mix	
Fossil CO2 
intensity	 • fuel switching towards lower-carbon fossil resources (e.g., gas) and away 
from higher-carbon fossil resources 
(e.g., coal)	
• reduction in the carbon content of coal 
and other fuels 	
• more use of carbon capture and storage	
 1	
 2	
Table 2. Correlations between numbers of policies and national trends in related CO2 3	
emission drivers during 2005-2015. Policies on energy efficiency are correlated with changes 4	
in energy use (adjusted for GDP growth in parenthesis, see Methods). Policies on renewable 5	
energy are correlated with changes in non-fossil energy. Climate framework policies are 6	
correlated with total changes in CO2. Bold numbers are statistically significant at the 95% 7	
level.  8	
 Energy 
efficiency 
Renewable 
energy 
Climate 
Peak-and-decline group  
Number of countries with available data 18 18 18 
Median [25-75 percentile] number of policies  35 [27-51] 23 [15-35] 10 [8-12] 
Correlation with related CO2 trend –0.54 (–0.42a)  –0.75 –0.54  
Control group A  
Number of countries with available data  24 30 30 
Median [25-75 percentile] number of policies  10 [3-28] 11 [7-19] 7 [5-8] 
Correlation with related CO2 trend –0.14 (–0.61)  –0.07  0.56  
Control group B  
Number of countries with available data 13 31 31 
Median [25-75 percentile] number of policies  2 [1-15] 6 [5-12] 8 [5-10] 
Correlation with related CO2 trend 0.55a (–0.66) 0.51 0.30 
a Statistically significant at the 90% level	9	 	10	 	11	 	12	
 13	
  14	
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Data and Methods:	1	
CO2 emissions and energy data: CO2 emissions are from fossil fuels only and are from the 2	
IEA Reference approach28, which estimate CO2 emissions using supply-side data of energy 3	
production. The final and primary energy data used in the decomposition come from IEA’s 4	
World Energy Balances database [accessed July 2018]29. Total primary and final energy are 5	
reported directly in the database, and we define the fossil share of final energy as direct final 6	
consumption of fossil fuels plus final consumption of heat and electricity derived from fossil 7	
sources. We also use four other sources of emissions to check the robustness of our analysis 8	
(see Supplementary Information): the Sector approach of the IEA; the national reports 9	
submitted to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC); BP; 10	
as well as emissions based on consumption accounting7,30.  11	
The ‘peak-and-decline’ group is selected based on those countries where emissions 12	
decreased significantly over the period 2005-2015 in at least three of the four databases, 13	
and where emissions also decreased significantly when accounted for on a consumption 14	
basis (Table S2; see also Supplementary information). It excludes Greece whose economy 15	
contracted severely during this period, and Jamaica because of suspected issues with the 16	
data. The two control groups include countries where emissions do not significantly 17	
decrease, with group A and B separated by their GDP growth rate below (group A) or above 18	
(group B) 3.5% per year. 	19	
GDP data are from the International Energy Agency, national currencies. 	20	
Policy data: We synthesized data on the cumulative number of policies promoting: (1) the 21	
use of renewable energy and (2) energy efficiency; and the cumulative number of (3) climate 22	
framework policies. Energy policy data is from the IEA/IRENA (International Renewable 23	
Energy Agency) Joint Policies and Measures database [accessed May 2018]. A climate 24	
framework policy is a legal act that seeks to provide a unifying basis for climate change 25	
mitigation and/or adaptation policy. We identified climate policies as frameworks if they 26	
were indicated accordingly by the Global Climate Legislation database, which is also the 27	
source for this data10. Given their broad scope, climate framework policies include a 28	
substantial share of measures targeting energy issues. However, the key difference between 29	
a climate framework policy and policies promoting the use of renewable energy and energy 30	
efficiency is that the latter were adopted as stand-alone pieces of legislation and exclusively 31	
target these two issues. In this analysis, policies such as the fraction of renewable energy 32	
target would be considered an energy policy under (1), even if the incentive for the policy is 33	
from addressing climate change. Many policies that encourage the deployment of 34	
renewable energy also encourage energy efficiency, so that (1) and (2) are themselves 35	
correlated. These variables include the total number of legal acts adopted nationally by 36	
2015. Data were available for at least two of three policy drivers for countries in groups A 37	
and B. 	38	
Correlation analysis: All correlations presented use the Spearman ranked correlation so that 39	
each country has the same weight. Significance is assessed with a two-tailed t-test. We 40	
present the median and 25-75 percentile as a measure of the general trends found in most 41	
countries. Note that the sum of the medians of the energy decomposition does not 42	
necessarily add up to 100%.  43	
Emission drivers: We separate different contributions to territorial CO2 emissions (C) 44	
between final energy (FE); the fraction (Cf) of that final energy from fossil fuels (FEff/FE); the 45	
ratio (Cr) of fossil fuel primary energy over fossil fuel final energy (PEff/FEff); and the carbon 46	
intensity (Ci) of that fossil fuel primary energy (C/PEff), as follows:	47	
	 9	
	𝐶 = 𝐹𝐸 × 𝐹𝐸''𝐹𝐸 × 𝑃𝐸''𝐹𝐸'' × 𝐶𝑃𝐸'' = 𝐹𝐸 × 𝐶' × 𝐶) × 𝐶*  (1)	
Examples of what these terms represent are provided in Table 2. The change in ∆𝐶 between 1	
two given years t2 and t1 is decomposed exactly using the Logarithmic Mean Divisia Index 2	
(LMDI) approach31 as follows: 	3	 ∆𝐶 = ∆𝐶,- 	+	∆𝐶/' + ∆𝐶/) + ∆𝐶/*  (2)	
where  4	
∆𝐶0 = 	 𝐶12 −	𝐶14ln 𝐶12 − ln 𝐶14 ln 7𝐶012𝐶0148 (3)	
We also further decompose FE of Eq. (1) into a contribution from GDP, and the energy 5	
intensity of GDP (Ei) to better understand the drivers of changes in energy demand:   6	 𝐹𝐸 = 𝐺𝐷𝑃 × ,-;<= = 𝐺𝐷𝑃 ×	𝐸*	  (4)	7	
Which extends Eq. (2) into: 8	 ∆𝐶 = ∆𝐶;<= 	+	∆𝐶-* +	∆𝐶/' + ∆𝐶/) + ∆𝐶/*  (5)	
The energy intensity of GDP includes all reductions in energy use per unit of GDP produced, 9	
and therefore includes energy intensity as well as structural changes in the economy (e.g. 10	
structural change from the production of goods to the production of services). See 11	
Supplementary Information for detailed results.  12	
 	13	
Acknowledgements	14	
C.L.Q., C.W., G.P.G and D.v.V. received funding from the UK Department of Business, Energy 15	
and Industrial Strategy, as part of the “Implications of global warming of 1.5°C and 2°C 16	
project”. A.J. and J.T. were supported by the European Commission COST Action IS1309 17	
(INOGOV). C.W. also received funding from ERC Starting Grant #678799 for the SILCI project. 18	
We thank L. Leopold for assistance with the policy data. 	19	
 20	21	
	 10	
Figures:	1	
 2	
Figure 1. Change in CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion for the 18 countries in the 3	
‘peak-and-decline’ group (in percent). The 2005-2015 time period analysed here is 4	
emphasized in purple, with the linear trend shown for each country. Emissions are from the 5	
IEA reference approach29. The countries are generally presented in order of their 6	
approximate peak date, with some permutations for clarity. Change is relative to the 2000-7	
2005 average.	8	
 9	
 10	
	 11	
 1	
 2	
Figure 2. Contributions to the decrease in national CO2 emissions from four physical drivers 3	
of change in energy production and use, as well as international trade, during 2005-2015. 4	
Each dot shows data for one country. Contributions are from changes in energy use 5	
(orange), fossil share of energy (green), fossil utilisation rate (blue), and fossil CO2 intensity 6	
(yellow; the four right-hand terms of Eq. 2; Table 2). The transfer of emissions due to 7	
outsourcing consumption through trade is also shown (red). Energy data are from the IEA 8	
Reference approach29. Data are for the 18 countries in the peak-and-decline country group, 9	
with the median and 25-75 percentile (bars). See Supplementary Table S3. 	10	
  11	
	 12	
 1	
Figure 3. Time-series of changes in CO2 emissions (top) and the contributions from changes 2	
in energy systems (percent per year). Contributions are from changes in energy use, the 3	
fossil share of energy, the fossil utilisation rate, and the fossil CO2 intensity (Table 1). Data 4	
are for the peak-and-decline group as in Fig. 2, analysed in increments of 5 years from 1960 5	
to 2015, showing the median and 25-75 percentile range. 6	
  7	
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